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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
c; UY KIMBALL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
KENNETH L. KINGSBURY and 
KATHLEEN KINGSBURY, his wife, 
Defendants and Third-Party \ 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
\ 
v. 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, NATIONWIDE 
MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE 
C:OMPANY, 
Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. I 
Case No. 
12422 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves an action to determine whether 
Kenneth L. Kingsbury and Kathleen Kingsbury had auto-
mobile liability coverage under an insurance policy issued 
bv the third-party defendants at the time of an accident. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The personal injury action ag . h 
ainst t e Kin b 
was separated from the action by th K' gs un1 
e ingsburys · 
Nationwide to determine liabT aga1rur 
• • 1 ity coverage. This a 1 
ts from a Judgment for Nationwide M I I ppea 
C utua nsuranc 
ompany, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insur Com t . ance pam 
against the Kingsburys. · 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This third-party defendant seeks affirmance of tht 
lower court judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants statement of facts is not complete. 
On October 8, 1968, at about 4:00 p.m. Guy Kimball. 
the plaintiff, was involved in an automobile accidem 
with Kathleen Kingsbury (R. 1). On November 20, 1968. 
Guy Kimball brought this action to recover damagei 
arising out of the October 8, 1968 accident (R. I, 21. 
Thereafter, Kathleen Kingsbury and Kenneth L. Kings· 
bury, her husband, (hereinafter called Kingsburn 
brought a third-party action against Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company (hereinafter called Nationwide) seek· 
ing indemnity (R. 3, 4, 5). 
d li~ In July of 1968 the Kingsburys purchase .a po · 
of automobile liability insurance from Nationwide. See 
d thly insrall Exhibit I. The policy was purchase on a moo 
. . K" b to pay a $2.80 prfJll· 
ment plan requiring the ings urys 
2 
a 
1 
ium on or before the 26th day of each month (Exhibit 12). 
Each premium payment card furnished with the Kings-
bt:rys' policy showed the premium due date. See Exhibit 
'), The policy contained a ten day grace period providing 
i:Jr cancellation by the insureds effective as of 12:01 a.m. 
un '.he tenth day following the due date of any installment 
premium. The policy reads: 
PREMIUM INSTALLMENTS-CANCELLATION BY INSURED 
The premium for this policy shall be payable in 
installments as shown in the premium notice 
mailed to the Policyholder. Failure of the Com-
pany to receive any installment when due shall be 
DEEMED A REQUEST BY THE POLICYHOLD-
ER TO CANCEL THE POLICY effective as of 
12:01 A.M. on the tenth (10th) day following the 
due date of any such installment. 
Exhibit 1, page 10. 
The Kingsburys did not pay their September 26, 1968 
payment. Therefore, the policy coverage would be can-
celled by its own terms unless payment was received by 
12:01 a.m. on October 6, 1968 - the tenth day following 
the dt:e date. 
On the afternoon of October 8, 1968 Mrs. Kingsbury 
"as involved in an accident with Guy Kimball. That 
same day a two month insurance premium was mailed to 
Nationwide. The envelope in which the payment was 
s~nt bears an October 8, 1968 p.m. postmark. See Exhibit 
8. The check for the premiums was dated October 7, 
1968. See Exhibit 6. 
3 
The issues between the Kingsburys and N . . at1onwidt 
were separated from those between Kimb II • • a and the 
Kmgsburys and tned to the court without a ju , on 1 , 
8, 1970 (R. 68). 
11 
. uL 
The court found the past due notice (Exhibit 3) was 
mailed by Nationwide October 1, 1968 from Portia d n. 
Oregon, to the Kingsburys in Salt Lake City and woull 
have been received by the Kingsburys on October 4, 196i. 
two days before the expiration of the grace period (R, 7~1. 
It found the installment due September 26, 1968 was nm 
received by Nationwide until October 11, 1968 (R. ·4 
(See also Exhibit 12). The lower court also found tha1 
there was a clear warning on the jacket of the policy ad· 
vising the Kingsburys that on the tenth day following tht 
due date the policy would be cancelled if the premiwn 
was not paid (R. 75, 90). 
On October 11, 1968 Nationwide received the Kingi 
burys' check and reinstated the Kingsburys' policy in ac· 
cordance with its regular practice, as of 12:01 a.m. on 
October 9, 1968, the day following the postmark on th< 
envelope. 
· effect from 
The lower court found no coverage m 
October 6 the end of the grace period, through ()ccobe: 
' h d h premium wa• 
8, the day of the accident and t e ate t e 
mailed (R. 75, 80). 
I d a judgrnen: 
Findings of fact, conclusions of aw, an. J · r 
. . · d and filed Ju ) -· 
in favor of Nat10nw1de were s1gne afcertb' 
1970 (R. 75). On August 21, more than ten days 
4 
---111111111 
entr\' of the judgment, the Kingsburys moved to amend 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment (R. 
--, 79). The judgment made and entered July 22, 1970 
was in favor of Nationwide only and against only the 
Kicgsburys (R. 75 ). No issues were generated in the 
con·rage lawsuit between the plaintiff, Kimball, and 
i\:•rionwide. 
On 1\ugust 25, 1970 Nationwide moved to strike the 
Kingsburys' motion to amend the findings of fact, con-
Llusiuns of law and judgment. This motion was denied 
IR. 88). 
The appellants did not order a transcript of the 
testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
FOINT I. THE PAST DUE NOTICE WAS 
NOT AN OFFER OR A WAIVER. 
Appellants argue that the past due notice Nationwide 
mailed to the Kingsburys was an offer which, when ac-
cepted, constituted a waiver by Nationwide of cancella-
1i i!: rights under the terms of the policy. 
They rely entirely upon Parker v. California State 
Life Insurance Co., 85 Utah 595, 40 P.2d 175 (1935) and 
Columbia Airu:ays, Inc. v. Stevens, 80 Utah 215, 14 P.2d 
98-± ( 19 .) 2). N either case is factually similar to this 
matter. 
5 
c 
Columbia Airways was an action for eta· d d . 
• • • • 1m an el11. 
ery m con1unct1on with the purchase of an · I . . a1rp ane. T nt 
court there pointed to repeated attempts to sec ure pavmeni 
on a note in lieu of exercising a right to take p · · ossess;on 
and held that the continuous demands for payment rnn. 
stituted a waiver of the right to take possession. 
The finding of a waiver in Parker also involwd 
repeated demands for payment. Parker arose from a claim 
for benefits under a life insurance policy. There, the in 
sured initially defaulted on March 23, 1930. On April I' 
the insurer executed an additional agreement extendin~ 
the coverage, provided payment was made by Sepcembtr 
23rd. 
Again payment was not made. Three days later tht 
insurer sent a letter requesting payment "suggesting that 
they believed the default to be an oversight .... " Still no 
payment was received. 
Over a month passed when, on November 4, 19lll. 
the insurer again wrote to the insured requesting p:ll· 
ment. This time the insured responded and mailed in h!• 
check. He was accidentally killed before the insurer r1· 
ceived payment. 
, ted solicitacior· 
The court held the insurer s repea f . 
· d waiver o it· 
over a period of eight months constitute a 
right to cancel. 
d attempts to se(Ul• 
This case involves no repeate 
payment long after it became due. 
6 
ctr' 
Herc, Nationwide mailed a single past due notice 
"ithin the ten-day grace period. It was received by the 
Kinµsbuq s in sufficient time for them to mail payment 
within the grace period. This the Kingsburys did not do. 
At the end of the grace period all coverage expired. 
\\'hen payment was received, Nationwide, according to 
it' regular practices reinstated the policy effective at 12:01 
.i.m. on the day following date of postmark - October 
~. 1968. 
As the court pointed out in Parker v. California State 
Life Jmurance Co., supra: 
"Whether a waiver has taken place or not 
ordinarily depends upon the peculiar facts and 
circumstances of a given case, and in most instances 
presents a question of fact rather than of law, or at 
least a mixed question of law and fact." 40 P.2d 
at 177 <Emphasis added.) 
Parker affirmed the trial court's finding of waiver. 
In this case the trier of fact found that there was 
no waiver. The credibility of the testimony was for the 
trier of fact, Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 
1115 (1955), Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 
R( 11%1), and on appeal the findings should not be dis-
turbed if supported by the facts viewed most favorable 
to rhe findings. Casey v. Nelson Brothers Construction 
Co .. 21 Utah 2d 14, 465 P.2d 173 (1970), Child v. Hay-
uard. 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 P.2d 758 (1965). 
7 
The decisions of this court show that th 1 . . e ower cour;; 
f 10d10g was proper. 
In Ballard v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 82 Uran 
1, 21 P.2d 847 0933), a life insurance policy was issuei! 
December 15, 1925. A loan was subsequently made 
10 
the insured on the policy with the loan being due Decem 
ber 15, 1928. About thirty days prior thereto the insurei! 
was given the usual written notice of such payment due. 
stating that the policy would become null and void unJes.; 
the payment were made. No reply was received frOl! 
the insured. On January 4, 1929 the defendant sent i 
second notice saying that the grace period was about 11 
expire which it did on January 15, 1929 without paymen: 
being received. After this date the company offered 11 
reinstate the policy if the insured would pay back prem 
iums with interest and if he would furnish evidence o· 
insurability. 
Several months passed when, on April 10th or lltli 
1929, the defendant received a check from Ballard~ 
questing reinstatement of the policy. 
Unknown to the company, Ballard had entered tli: 
·1 5 h · h condition whic hospital in Logan on Apn t wit a 
ultimately led to his death on October I 3th of that)'~ 
This court found as a matter of law that there w~ 
no waiver under those facts and circumstances. 
8 
Cooper i·. Foresters Underwriters, 2 Utah 2d 373, 
2"'5 P.2 675 (1954), is also in point. The policy involved 
in Cooper required payment of advance monthly premi-
ums :ind provided that all periods of insurance would 
begin :ind end at 12: 00 noon on the last day of the month. 
(overage remained in effect for a period of 31 days after 
the premium was due. The plaintiff did not pay a premi-
um for the months of September or October, 1951 until 
che evening of October 31. At that same time she sub-
mitted a claim for an accident occurring during the after-
noon of October 31. In holding that the insurance com-
pany did not waive its rights this court said: 
Plaintiff must be charged with the knowledge 
of her contract and we cannot find that any belief 
that the company would accept late payments as 
a continuation of the policy rather than a rein-
statement could be reasonably induced by the com-
pany's behavior. She had a right to reinstate sub-
ject to the exclusion of any accident occurring 
prior to the acceptance of the premium and could 
not reasonably have believed that the acceptance 
of the premium was to cover the entire period of 
time preceding. 275 P.2d at 677. 
The front cover of Nationwide's policy is conspicu-
ously marked: 
DON'T LOSE YOUR INSURANCE! 
Please Read "Premium Installments -
Cancellation By Insured" - Page 10 
On page I 0 it is further stated: 
PREMIUM INSTALLMENTS-CANCELLATION BY INSURED 
The premium for this policy shall be payable in 
installments as shown in the premium notice 
9 
mailed to the Policyholder F .1 . · a1 ure of th ( 
pany to receive any installment wh d e .o~ 
DEEMED A REQUEST BY THE pe~L ue shall~ 
ER TO CANCEL THE POLICY ff 10'HOL~ 
12:01 A.M. on the tenth OOth) d efelcluv~asr 
d d f ay o owin~ tl ue ate o any such installment. "' 
The language of Nationwide's policy i's 1 . c™~ 
unambiguous; it should be given effect. 
"[I] nasmuch as insurance coverage is base; 
on contract, unless there is some good reason 1 
the contrary, we are obliged to assume that !ant 
uage incl~de~ therein was put there for a pur)XI~ 
and to give it effect where its meaning is cltr 
and unambiguous." Marriot v. Pacific Nation; 
Life Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d%. 
983 (1970). 
The critical fact in this case was undisputed: di: 
Kingsburys mailed their premium in after the ten cJ1 
grace period had expired. One failing to pay insuranL: 
premiums must also accept the consequences of that der 
sion. The lower court properly found the Kingsbun' 
insurance coverage had lapsed at the time of Mrs. King' 
bury's accident. 
Appellants' argument on waiver is deficient in ac 
1 · d'd ot ra1k other respect. The Third Party Comp amt 1 n 
the issue (R. 3-5); no mention of the waiver tbeof) 
1
' 
found in the findings (R. 73-75, 88-90; and nothini 
. f d . ellants' "Statr 
about the waiver theory is oun to app 
ment of Points on Appeal" (R. 95-96). 
10 
-----1111 
The purpose of filing a statement of points on ap-
ocal is to provide an orderly procedure when a complete 
;unscript of the evidence is not requested. 
Jn Simpson v. General Motors, 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 
P.2d .~99, 40 I (I 970), where an attempt was made to 
inject a new theory into the case for the first time on 
Jppeal this court said: 
"The contention relating to strict liability is 
an attempt to inject that doctrine into this case 
for the first time on appeal. It was dealt with 
neither in the plaintiff's complaint, nor in the 
pretrial conference, nor at the trial. It is there-
fore not appropriate to address such a contention 
to this court. Orderly procedure, whose proper 
purpose is the final settlement of controversies, 
requires that a party must present his entire case 
and his theory or theories of recovery to the trial 
court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter 
change to some different theory and thus attempt 
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation." 
POINT II. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO 
ST ANDING TO APPEAL. 
The judgment in the lower court is in favor of Na-
tion\\ ide and against Kingsburys only. No issues were 
gen..:rated in the coverage lawsuit between the plaintiff 
and Nationwide. Under the terms of the policy no duty 
was owed by Nationwide to the plaintiff. As such he 
1 ~ not a proper party to this appeal. 
In Tr;adt1u.:ay v. Meador, 103 Ariz. 83, 436 P.2d 
902 ( 1968), the Supreme Court of Arizona said that when 
11 
certain parties were not named in th . d 
f . e JU gtnent be\01 rom which the appeal was taken the 
. Y were not pror.. 
parties to present an appeal. r' 
In Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Ex h . c ange, I' 
Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), this court said: 
judgment creditor had no privity of contract with ili: 
defendant's insurer and the insurer owed no duty 10 ilit 
judgment creditor. 
Plaintiff should be dismissed from this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The appeal as to the plaintiff Kimball should ~ 
dismissed as he has no standing. The judgment for ~,. 
tionwide should be affirmed because the issues belo~ 
were basically fact issues and the evidence and all inie: 
ences when considered in the light most fovorable K 
the judgment show the lower court's decision to be su~ 
ported by substantial and credible evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSE' 
7th Floor Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
12 
MAILING NOTICE 
I hereby certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
hrief, postage prepaid to Thomas R. Blonquist, 640 Ken-
necott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Boyd 
o. Fullmer, 540 East Fifth South, Suite 203, Salt Lake 
Cin-, Utah 84102, this -------- day of June, 1971. 
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